Book: Living in the End Times
Quotes of Book: Living in the End Times
It is as if, in today's permissive society, transgressive violations are allowed only in a "privatized" form, as a personal idiosyncrasy deprived of any public, spectacular, or ritualistic dimension. We can thus publicly confess all our weird private practices, but they remain simply private idiosyncrasies. Perhaps we should also invert here the standard formula of fetishistic disavowal: "I know very well {that I should obey the rules}, but nonetheless . . . {I occasionally violate them, since this too is part of the rules}." In contemporary society, the predominant stance is rather: "I believe {that repeated hedonistic transgressions are what make life worth living}, but nonetheless . . . {I know very well that these transgressions are not really transgressive, but are just artificial coloring serving to re-emphasize the grayness of social reality}. book-quoteAs every close observer of the deadlocks arising from the political correctness knows, the separation of legal justice from moral Goodness –which should be relativized and historicized- ends up in an oppressive moralism brimming with resentment. Without any "organic" social substance grounding the standards of what Orwell approvingly called "common decency" {all such standards having been dismissed as subordinating individual freedoms to proto-Fascist social forms}, the minimalist program of laws intended simply to prevent individuals from encroaching upon one another {annoying or "harassing" each other} turns into an explosion of legal and moral rules, an endless process {a "spurious infinity" in Hegel's sense} of legalization and moralization, known as "the fight against all forms of discrimination." If there are no shared mores in place to influence the law, only the basic fact of subjects "harassing other subjects, who-in the absence of mores- is to decide what counts as "harassment"? In France, there are associations of obese people demanding all the public campaigns against obesity and in favor of healthy eating be stopped, since they damage the self-esteem of obese persons. The militants of Veggie Pride condemn the speciesism" of meat-eaters {who discriminate against animals, privileging the human animal-for them, a particularly disgusting form of "fascism"} and demand that "vegeto-phobia" should be treated as a kind of xenophobia and proclaimed a crime. And we could extend the list to include those fighting for the right of incest marriage, consensual murder, cannibalism . . .
The problem here is the obvious arbitrariness of the ever-new rule. Take child sexuality, for example: one could argue that its criminalization is an unwarranted discrimination, but one could also argue that children should be protected from sexual molestation by adults. And we could go on: the same people who advocate the legalization of soft drugs usually support the prohibition of smoking in public places; the same people who protest the patriarchal abuse of small children in our societies worry when someone condemns a member of certain minority cultures for doing exactly this {say, the Roma preventing their children from attending public schools}, claiming that this is a case od meddling with other "ways of life". It is thus for necessary structural reasons that the "fight against discrimination" is an endless process which interminably postpones its final point: namely a society freed from all moral prejudices which, as Michea puts it, "would be on this very account a society condemned to see crimes everywhere. book-quote{L}iberals insist that children should be given the right to remain part of their particular community, but on condition that they are given a choice. But for, say, Amish children to really have a free choice of which way of life to choose, either their parents' life or that of the "English," they would have to be properly informed on all the options, educated in them, and the only way to do what would be to extract them from their embeddedness in the Amish community, in other words, to effectively render them "English." This also clearly demonstrates the limitations of the standard liberal attitude towards Muslim women wearing a veil: it is deemed acceptable if it is their free choice and not an option imposed on them by their husbands or family. However, the moment a woman wears a veil as the result of her free individual choice, the meaning of her act changes completely: it is no longer a sign of her direct substantial belongingness to the Muslim community, but an expression of her idiosyncratic individuality, of her spiritual quest and her protest against the vulgarity of the commodification of sexuality, or else a political gesture of protest against the West. A choice is always a meta-choice, a choice of the modality of choice itself: it is one thing to wear a veil because of one's immediate immersion in a tradition; it is quite another to refuse to wear a veil; and yet another to wear one not out of a sense of belonging, but as an ethico-political choice. This is why, in our secular societies based on "choice," people who maintain a substantial religious belonging are in a subordinate position: even if they are allowed to practice their beliefs, these beliefs are "tolerated" as their idiosyncratic personal choice or opinion; they moment they present them publicly as what they really are for them, they are accused of "fundamentalism." What this means is that the "subject of free choice" {in the Western "tolerant" multicultural sense} can only emerge as the result of an extremely violent process of being torn away from one's particular lifeworld, of being cut off from one's roots. book-quote
