What made the Schlieffen plan was not Clausewitz and the Battle of Cannae, but the body of accumulated egoism which suckled the German people and created a nation fed on the desperate delusion of the will that deems itself absolute.
The Schlieffen Plan, often linked to military theorists like Clausewitz and historical battles such as Cannae, emerged more from a pervasive sense of egoism within the German nation. This egoism fostered a belief in their own superiority, creating a collective mindset that viewed their will as unassailable and absolute. It reflects how national identity and psychological factors can shape military strategies and decisions.
In "The Guns of August," Barbara W. Tuchman emphasizes that this self-delusion among the German people was crucial in shaping their war strategy. Rather than being solely based on military doctrine, the plan was deeply intertwined with a national character that overestimated its capabilities and righteousness. The narrative illustrates how perception and belief play significant roles in the course of historical events, particularly in the context of World War I.
