When we call a philosopher distinguished, we are not saying that she is worthy and not saying that she is recognized, but we are saying that she occupies the intersection of both – that she is recognized and worthy; even that she is recognized because she's worthy. In the case of arate, the direction of the "because" can seem a little vaguer, so that it can sometimes seem almost as if someone is regarded as worthy because they are recognized.
The term "distinguished philosopher" implies a dual recognition of worthiness and acknowledgment in the philosophical community. When someone is described as distinguished, it suggests that they are valued for their contributions and that this recognition is a reflection of their merit. This nuanced relationship highlights the importance of both aspects in understanding how philosophers gain their status and credibility within the field.
Goldstein points out that the interplay between worthiness and recognition can be complex. Specifically, with the concept of arate, the relationship may appear less clear-cut. It sometimes seems that individuals are deemed worthy due to their recognition, challenging the conventional notion that recognition stems from inherent worthiness. This ambiguity raises questions about how we evaluate philosophical contributions and the criteria we use to determine a philosopher's standing in the discipline.