Why is taste, the crudest of our senses, exempted from the ethical rules that govern our other senses? If you stop and think about it, it's crazy. Why doesn't a horny person have as strong a claim to raping an animal as a hungry one does to killing and eating it? It's easy to dismiss that question but hard to respond to it. And how would you judge an artist who mutilated animals in a gallery because it was visually arresting? How riveting would the sound of a tortured animal need to be to make you want to hear it that badly? Try to imagine any end other than taste for which it would be justifiable to do what we do to farmed animals.
Jonathan Safran Foer raises provocative questions about the ethical treatment of animals, particularly in relation to our senses, especially taste. He challenges why taste, often considered a basic sensory pleasure, seems to escape the moral scrutiny that applies to our other senses. For instance, he asks why society doesn't respond more strongly to someone who has a sexual desire for animals compared to how it reacts to those who kill animals for food. This inconsistency in ethical considerations prompts deeper reflection on our values and justifications in consuming animals.
Foer further explores the moral implications of how we treat animals, suggesting that the actions we take for the sake of taste or aesthetic pleasure can often collide with ethical standards. He questions the justification of horrific actions, such as artists inflicting pain on animals for shock value or beauty, and asks readers to consider the boundaries of ethical behavior in the context of our consumption habits. Ultimately, he compels us to think critically about the ends we pursue in relation to the means we employ in our treatment of farmed animals.
