Why is taste, the crudest of our senses, exempted from the ethical rules that govern our other senses? If you stop and think about it, it's crazy. Why doesn't a horny person have as strong a claim to raping an animal as a hungry one does to killing and eating it?
In "Eating Animals," Jonathan Safran Foer raises provocative questions regarding the moral implications of our senses, particularly taste. He argues that taste, despite being one of the most basic human senses, seems to be treated with a different ethical standard than others. This discrepancy in how we view the justification for various sensory desires is intriguing and merits deeper examination.
Foer points out the inconsistency in justifying hunger as a reason for killing an animal while questioning why arousal does not carry a similar justification for harmful actions. This highlights a broader ethical dilemma surrounding our interactions with animals and challenges the principles that guide our choices rooted in instinct and desire.
