In fact, the fear of another Munich was not altogether new. It had been an underlying element in the decision to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's aggression in 1991. If we didn't stop Saddam in Kuwait, he would have next invaded Saudi Arabia, thereby controlling the world's oil supply and taking human rights in the region to an unutterable level of darkness.
The fear of repeating historical mistakes, such as the 1938 Munich Agreement, has long influenced international policy decisions. This sentiment notably played a role in the Gulf War of 1991, where the United States and its allies sought to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion. The underlying concern was that failing to act against Saddam would lead him to expand his aggression, posing a significant threat to regional stability and ultimately the global oil supply.
Kaplan emphasizes that the stakes were incredibly high; Iraq's control over the Middle East's oil resources could not only shift the balance of power but also severely impact human rights conditions in the region. By intervening, the coalition aimed to prevent a descent into economic and humanitarian crises, illustrating how historical lessons on appeasement continue to shape current geopolitical strategies.
