Why, for example, wasn't AIG required to reserve capital against them? Why, for that matter, were Moody's and Standard & Poor's willing to bless 80 percent of a pool of dicey mortgage loans with the same triple-A rating they bestowed on the debts of the U.S. Treasury? Why didn't someone, anyone, inside Goldman Sachs stand up and say, "This is obscene. The rating agencies, the ultimate pricers of all these subprime mortgage loans, clearly do not understand the risk, and their idiocy is creating a recipe for catastrophe"?
The text raises critical questions regarding the financial practices that led to the 2008 financial crisis, specifically focusing on AIG's lack of capital reserves and the questionable ratings from major agencies like Moody's and Standard & Poor's. It highlights the contradiction between the high ratings given to risky mortgage loans and the secure debts of the U.S. Treasury, suggesting a significant disconnect in risk assessment.
Furthermore, the excerpt calls attention to the lack of dissent within influential financial institutions like Goldman Sachs. It implies that individuals in these organizations should have recognized the dangers posed by the misleading ratings from agencies, yet there was a troubling silence. This silence contributed to a precarious situation that ultimately played a part in the financial meltdown.
